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Executive Summary 
 
Data error, modification, and loss can occur in scientific computing due to numerous potential 
causes, including those natural, accidental, or malicious in nature.  Such errors and 
modifications can silently impact scientific computing results if not detected and corrected or 
compensated for through other means.  The goal of this document is to describe the ways in 
which integrity faults due to bit flips occur, their potential odds of occurring, and potential 
mitigation mechanisms in high-level, practical terms, and is broken into individual computer 
components and environments describing each of those elements.  We conclude the report by 
summarizing key issues and several best practices for mitigation of the effects of bit 
flip-induced errors. 
 
 
1 Background 
 
Data error, modification, and loss can occur in scientific computing for numerous reasons, 
including, but not limited to improper scientific design, mis-calibrated sensors, and outright 
bugs including unaccounted-for non-determinism in computational workflows, improper 
roundoff and truncation errors, hardware failures, and “natural” faults.  In addition, numerous 
other sources of “error” beyond “bit flips” can arise with regard to reproducibility, including 
inability to recreate the same software and/or hardware conditions that gave the original 
results, such as legacy code incompatible with modern systems, among other conditions. 
 
Nonetheless, “bit errors” in data files can and do happen, and can be classified in three types 
types: (1) isolated single errors due to some kind of interference causing bit flips; (2) bursty 
faults of a number of sequential bits, due to some kind of mechanical failure or electrical 
interference; (3) malicious tampering.  This document focuses on the first.  The goal of this 
document is to describe the ways integrity faults occur, their potential odds of occurring, and 
potential mitigation mechanisms in high-level, practical terms, and is broken into individual 
computer components and environments describing each of those elements.  
 
We note that this document is not a new survey of approaches for detecting data corruption, or 
analyzing its impact on scientific computing applications -- a variety of work in that space has in 
fact been done over the past several years, which we recommend for further reading [BGC15, 
DC16, Pei15a, Pei15b, Pei17, RVD+19, WA19].  For example, we do not focus on the questions 
of how many bits need to flip in order for a scientific result to be materially altered or a dataset 
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rendered useless. 
 
This document is primarily targeted at scientists and IT personnel involved in scientific 
computing applications.   It is secondarily targeted at personnel involved in maintaining 
“scientific cyberinfrastructure” such as community data repositories, computing facilities, and 
user facilities with scientific instruments, though we presume that such environments tend to 
have existing protocols, established over many years through scientific community dialogues, to 
determine best practices for things like data integrity.  
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2 Current State of Practice 
 
In some cases, such as an election, a single bit flip is clearly vital, since a single bit can 
determine if a race is won or lost by a given candidate.  In other places, we have learned, in  our 
survey of the community, that research computing teams tend to assume bit flips are dealt with 
at the hardware, network, and/or filesystem level, and simple checksums are generally trusted. 
Where those basic measures fail, bit flips are typically assumed to be possible, and, like most 
science data that contains “noise,” are inconsequential, and simply lost in that noise.  A good 
example is image data, which can frequently contain distortions or other anomalies, regardless 
of flipped bits.  Alternatively, for a set of time series events, there's an assumption that if you 
don't have every single point, or some individual point is off, as is frequently the case with 
sensor data, you just throw that point away. 
 
It is scientific cyberinfrastructure that tends to set the “gold standard” for addressing integrity. 
Consider DataONE and its constituent repositories — hashes and checksums are used, data is 
immediately replicated (with the hash of the replicated object checked upon replication), and 
the data is write-once-never-delete. Getting data into DataONE leverages the metacat software 
containing built-in integrity checks.  Additionally, to defend against malicious alteration, access 
controls are in place for reads and writes, such as managing storage space and protecting 
against abuse.  Even there, the write-once-never-delete policy addresses data modification and 
loss.  Of course DataONE is a repository with preservation as a goal, and so it's at one end of the 
spectrum of measures taken to defend against modification or loss. 
 
On the same end of the spectrum are science projects that have particular security needs, such 
science involving detection of atmospheric conditions hazardous to human health.  Here, too, 
the "right" thing is usually done with access controls, data transfers via SSL/SCP (which leverage 
the encryption protocol's hash function), sanity checks of metadata, split storage of hashes and 
data, pushing data to multiple locations, and regular backups. 
 
What about scientific research involving computing other than examples such as these?  What 
do they do?  Most other projects seem rarely to do things that require extra effort from 
researchers, or require challenging integrations, like hashing files on disk.  On the other hand, 
checksums are built into a lot of tools like SSH and Globus.  REST APIs may be the "wild west" -- 
while some API authors will use SSL, others may not.  And of course FTP simply relies on TCP 
checksums, which, as we discuss below, may be insufficient.  In our investigations, we 
discovered that ZFS is much more commonly used than we would have expected, as a backend 
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by databases that lack a multi-phase commit (e.g., Postgres, mySQL) to avoid corruption. 
RAID-5 or above is typically a given, to also help avoid corruption and data loss. Both ZFS, a 
software solution, and RAID-5 (or above), a mixed hardware/software solution, represent 
important and relatively straightforward safeguards to data integrity from bit flips and data 
loss, respectively. 
 
The projects that follow the most rigorous practices with regard to data loss and modification 
are typically data repositories with the primary goal of protecting data.  However, DataONE, 
one such repository, only covers the repository, not the path from the sensor or the simulation 
to​ the repository.  1
 
3 Example Use Cases 
 
We begin by discussing two example use cases. 
Automated Chemical Analysis 
An automated chemical analysis workflow is an example of integrity practices that could stand 
to be improved, should the need be of importance. 
 
The chemical analysis workflow begins with data being read by the network-connected 
instrument.  Each data file from the sensor is about 800 MB and takes about 15 minutes to 
generate.  This data is then manipulated and analyzed in an automated fashion and ultimately 
is stored in a database for user retrieval.  At each step, data is transferred over an IP network 
and is handled by different servers.  Bit errors on the data and files used in each step will have a 
different impact on the final results. 
 
If the analog datastream from the instrument has sudden changes in the recorded value, results 
can be assumed to be incorrect.  Researchers expect Gaussian-shaped signals on a noise floor. 
In order to validate that this is true, in the workflow, the shape of this function is checked and 
examined for sudden spikes (e.g., caused by a bit error).  If such deviations occur, that data 
point is discarded, although no alert is given nor are logs are kept of this action. 
 
1  Though not a focus of this report, we note in passing that for most projects, other than those involving the most 
sensitive of information, the notion of someone modifying data maliciously is not seen as a major risk other than 
basics of authentication and access controls. 
 
An Examination and Survey of Random Bit Flips and 
Scientific Computing ​| Trusted CI 
For Public Distribution 
6 
 
 
The data elements containing time and masses have to be maintained in sequential order. 
However, the workflow does not currently check to see if the time and masses recorded are in 
order.  The analysis scripts assume times and masses are in order but do not check. In addition 
to bit flips in data elements, bit flips in metadata could have dramatic consequences ranging 
from the misinterpretation of results to mixing different samples.  This could be partially 
checked if the data is in the expected ranges (e.g., adequately spaced from each other), which is 
not currently being performed. 
 
After the raw, sampled data from the chemical analysis instrument is analyzed, the resulting 
output is transformed into an area or height value.  These values, unlike the raw, sampled data, 
do not have the “redundancy” present that enables error checking (i.e., if it fits the Gaussian 
shape), and therefore would suffer greatly from any bit flips; only major outliers would be 
found the finalizing QA/QC process from a human operator.  Data size is also dramatically 
reduced, from 800 MB to 1 KB. 
 
We now discuss the protocols used and their impact on data integrity:  
 
Data is first captured on the analysis instrument’s built-in computer’s hard drive.  This 
computer with ECC memory runs a Windows 10 operating system. It is using the NTFS 
filesystem, which does not currently have built-in integrity properties like ZFS. From there, the 
raw data is converted from an internal file format to an industry-standard output format, 
though with the same values.  This standard data format is stored on disk again and then 
transferred via Samba over an IP network to network storage, a Linux-based server also with 
ECC memory.  This server is currently being upgraded from RAID-6 to ZFS (array of mirrored 2
vdevs) while receiving additional storage disks for increased capacity.  This network storage is 
then accessed by another machine via NFS, and with several processing operations, such as 
analyses, and conversions, in between, each with intermediate files stored on local disk.  Finally 
the derived data is stored again on the same NFS system.  From there, it is copied as a ‘csv’ file 
to the user’s local system via NFS or Samba and uploaded from the user’s local system to the 
database server. 
 
This database server is only storing a few KB per experiment, resulting in the database being 
fairly small (~50MB). Apart from regular backups, the data can be restored from the original 
source data, which is currently backed up to a Google Drive via the Google Drive web interface 
2 This server is currently being upgraded from RAID-6 to ZFS (array of mirrored vdevs) while receiving additional 
storage disks for increased capacity. 
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(and so integrity is therefore theoretically maintained via HTTPS). This however would require 
doing significant and time consuming analysis work again. 
 
For both Samba and NFS storage, the protocol ensures that the file transfer is complete before 
reporting success.  In addition, both methods could and should use encrypted file transfers that 
in addition to privacy also provide integrity protection based on the hash algorithm used by the 
encryption protocol.  However, both use the default configuration of each protocol that uses 
unencrypted and non-integrity-protected file streams, thereby solely relying on the TCP/IP 
protocol checksums to check for bit errors.  
 
If the project were to consider enhancing integrity protections, it should switch to encrypted 
file transfer as the effort of doing so would likely be complete in one or two hours.  The project 
could also ensure greater integrity checking at relatively low cost by using ECC memory and ZFS 
at each point in the storage chain.  Alternatively, cryptographic hashes could be used at each 
point in the process, instead of ZFS and/or encrypted communications.  If bit flips were deemed 
to be frequent or particularly devastating, using a fault tolerant, consensus-based computing 
approach, such as Paxos, would also be warranted. 
 
Urban Sensor Data Analysis 
An urban sensor data analysis pipeline is a positive example of “integrity done right.” 
 
This project is a scientific data collection and retrieval system of data pertaining to detection of 
hazardous conditions with respect to air quality, radiation, etc....  It is used by dozens of sites 
(each with potentially many users at each site) and contains currently 280TB of data with 
datasets ranging from a few MB to hundreds of GB.  Users have the ability to upload, search, 
and download these datasets using a simple web interface and also an API. 
 
In the project, data integrity has been one of the design parameters from the beginning, and 
each step in the processing chain has built-in data integrity protection.  As an example, the file 
transfers and process for user upload and download are described below. 
 
The user can upload data is two ways: Either via the web interface or SCP. Both methods are 
encrypted and integrity is protected with the encryption protocol’s hash function. 
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After the data is received, the associated metadata is checked to ensure it is present and 
follows the design schema.  Subsequently, the data is hashed and the hash and the file itself are 
stored on separate systems such that complete file losses are detectable.  This hash is available 
to the user and the user can check the uploaded and downloaded data against the hash to 
detect partial data losses, including bit flips. 
 
Metadata is stored in a MongoDB database that is regularly backed up, protecting against total 
data loss but not protecting the integrity of the metadata. Furthermore the metadata is saved 
alongside with the stored data. Therefore, the database can be completely rebuilt if an error is 
found.  However, finding such an error requires the user to check the data, either through the 
stored hashes or through other means. 
 
4 Detailed Component Discussion 
Processor/Internal Bus/External Cabling 
The undetected bit error rate of both internal busses and external cabling is 10​-12​, and is in line 
with the other devices and components connected to computers that are used in a computer. 
This rate is due to the added bits present in communication protocols that serve the purpose of 
error correction, among other things. 
 
In practical terms, scientists improve the undetected bit error rate within processors, busses, 
and cables by cross-checking suitably large checksums.  This checking can be done, for example, 
if one is looking for bit errors during computation after multiple runs on the same device, or on 
other devices if the validation takes place after sending or receiving data between systems.  
 
Consensus algorithms, such as Paxos [Lam98] and Practical Byzantine Fault Tolerance [CL02] 
can mask errors in addition to detecting them, although at a cost of required redundancy,  3
slowdown, and the effort to modify code and/or workflows to leverage the consensus 
algorithms.  Masking sure errors is most important where the consequence of small numbers of 
random errors is very high, or in situations where the random error rate is particularly high, 
such as in environments with increased amounts of ionizing radiation, e.g.., at high elevations 
or the Earth’s polar regions (see “Data Integrity in Extreme Environments” section below). 
 
3  To mask f failures, required redundancy is 2f+1 for Paxos and most crash-tolerant protocols; and 3f+1 for most 
BFT protocols 
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RAM 
There are numerous analyses that provide statistics about how often bit flips in DRAMs occur. 
However, none of them apply for all situations and applications.  In one study, Schroder et al 
[SPW09] monitored the DRAM errors in the thousands of systems of the famous Google 
server-farm for a period of 2 1/2 years.  Those servers were surely perfectly air-conditioned, 
dust-free and protected from radiations of all kinds. Still they came to the result of 25,000 to 
70,000 FIT (failures per billion device hours) of “ECC correctable errors” per Megabit of DRAM. 
This failure rate converts into an average of one single-bit-error every 14 to 40 hours per 
Gigabit of DRAM [IM].  The field study also explains that the error-rate increases by the age of 
the memory. 
 
Brand new DRAM might not show any errors for weeks and months, but then the error-rate 
suddenly goes up. Uncorrectable errors could be double- or multi-bit errors or complete 
functional fails of the DRAM. These can all not be corrected, but are extremely rare. 
 
Error-correcting code memory [ECC] can detect and correct errors of a single bit per 64-bits or 
detect up to 2 errors utilizing Hamming Codes. This requires 12.5% (1 bit of redundancy per 
byte of data) of additional memory cells to store said redundancy information. Since DRAM 
errors are highly susceptible to the environment and age of the chips, the chance of having an 
undetected error can be as large as 9% over a timespan of 3 years [Del97] and grows 
exponentially with age. 
 
Reading files from memory and comparing a current hash with a stored hash can be done 
periodically to check for such errors, but requires significant overhead and can only be 
performed if the content of the file in RAM is not changing. 
 
Long Term Storage 
HDDs and SSDs 
Many errors are detected and corrected by the hard disk drives and solid state devices using 
the ECC/CRC codes that are stored on disk for each sector. If the disk drive detects multiple 
read errors on a sector it may make a copy of the failing sector on another part of the disk by 
remapping the failed sector of the disk to a spare sector without the involvement of the 
operating system (though this may be delayed until the next write to the sector). This "silent 
correction" can be monitored using S.M.A.R.T. and tools available for most operating systems 
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to automatically check the disk drive for impending failures by watching for deteriorating 
SMART parameters. This remapping is particularly important for SSDs as sectors age quickly 
with the number of bytes written, and often less than the raw storage is available to the user to 
mitigate this effect [Kingston]. 
  
In a recent study of 1.53 million disk drives over 41 months [BAA+07], Bairavasundaram et al. 
show that 400,000 blocks across 3,855 drives (0.25% of the drives) had checksum mismatches. 
This same statistic also applies to USB “thumb drives,” as they use the same NAND-Chips as 
SSDs.  One conclusion we might draw from this is that if bit flips occur on storage media, it is 
likely to be more than a single block that is flipped. 
 
In order to gain more reliability one can use multiple drives in a RAID configuration where parts 
of the storage is used for redundancy.  By default, RAID-1, RAID-5, and RAID-6 (and derivatives) 
protect against failed devices (but not bit errors) by allowing for a certain number of failed 
devices before data loss.  RAID can be used to detect errors as well by manually triggering 
integrity checks or rebuilds.  RAID-5 and RAID-6 can fix errors in addition to detecting them 
through the same process.  The downside of manual detection is the potential to not capture 
errors until the validation period, and only discover until later that any derived data calculations 
made on the erroneous data in the interim are wrong. 
 
An alternative to periodic hardware-based integrity checks provided by RAID 1, 5, and 6, is to 
leverage software checks provided by some file systems, such as Btrfs, HAMMER, ReFS, and ZFS 
[ZRA+10].  These can use internal data and metadata checksumming to detect silent data 
corruption. ZFS, for example, can use SHA-256 to validate data integrity, reducing the 
probability of undetectable and uncorrectable errors to less than 2​-256​ per file.  This can also 
help identify failing storage devices or respective bus interconnects [Goe17].  In addition, if a 
corruption is detected and the file system uses integrated mechanisms that provide data 
redundancy, such as ZFS’s “RAID-Z”, such file systems can also reconstruct corrupted data in a 
transparent way [BtrFS].  This error correction takes place at the cost of requiring multiple 
disks, but provides strong guarantees against masking any random data integrity failures. 
 
Tape 
We note in passing that tape storage uses forward correcting codes to achieve error rates of 
10e-19 for LTO7 storage systems; which is particularly important for long term (up to 30 years 
[Tap19]) archives, as those are typically not checked routinely [Sli15].  The correct storage 
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environment, with a Temperature 61°F to 77°F (16°C to 25°C) with a Relative Humidity 20% to 
50% is important to achieve the predicted lifetime [Tap19]. 
 
Here, too, redundancy can help not only detect errors but also to enable correction. To our 
knowledge, no automated techniques for correcting integrity errors from tape systems exist, 
making this process more labor intensive than keeping data in live storage on disks and relying 
on a techniques such as RAID-Z, where possible. 
 
Non-Atomic Operations and Available Disk Space 
In any storage environment, data is written to the storage media block by block. This happens 
through a caching mechanism for performance reasons. In the event that the cache is not 
written to disk correctly (e.g, because the storage media is full or there is a power outage and 
the cache is lost [Note: Some but not all raid controllers and SSDs have built in battery buffers 
to write the cache to disk]) there will be incomplete data written to disk.  This can lead to data 
corruption if data is only partially written or is even partially overwritten. The application 
writing the data to disk has to be able to deal with failures in a safe manner, for example 
writing new data blocks to disk first and then changing a pointer to the most recent block in an 
atomic operation. If anything goes wrong while writing the data, only the most recently written 
data will be affected, but not existing data. 
 
PostgreSQL is ACID (Atomicity, Consistency, Isolation, Durability) compliant and theoretically 
ensures that all requirements are met.  However, even with ACID databases, there can be 
implementation bugs.  For example, consider a string of database writes that are individually 
atomic but experience a disk full situation partially through writing the entire string.  In such a 
case, the database may be left in an uncertain state in which even audit logs cannot be 
analyzed to determine exactly what happened because the disk filled in the process.  Some 
databases and indeed some filesystems take steps to avoid such errors by reserving a small 
portion of the disk to finish a limited set of operations even when the disk is otherwise 
presented as “full.”  Alternatively, some databases can project forward the result of a string of 
comments to determine if there is sufficient space to successfully execute all of them. 
However, there also exist many systems that do not take such steps and/or have bugs in the 
implementation. The safest conclusion is that data corruption remains a real and present threat 
in the event of a disk full error, and so a disk should likely never be filled past a certain 
threshold. Thresholds will vary depending on the size of the disk and the type of applications 
the system is being used for, but limiting used disk space to something on the order of 80-90% 
before adding additional disk capacity is not generally considered unreasonable. 
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Networking 
In networking with TCP/IP there will be transmission errors.  The TCP checksums can detect up 
to 15 flipped bits per packet.  However, bit flips can exceed the detection accuracy of the TCP 
checksum.  In fact, “Between 1 packet in 1,100 and 1 packet in 32,000 can fail the TCP 
checksum” [SP00].  “We conclude that the checksum will fail to detect errors for roughly 1 in 16 
million to 10 billion packets” [SP00], or between 0.008% and 0.22% of incorrect transmission 
passed the TCP checksum in a real life test [PHS95]. 
 
Example 
For FTP data transfers, including Globus’s GridFTP, MTU is typically 1,500 bytes [ABK+05].  So, 
for a  100 TB data transfer, we might expect an average of 2,000,000-60,600,000 errors, from 
which in expectation 6-4,000 errors will not be detected by TCP checksums [SP00].  
Mediation 
One remediation is a 32 Byte CRC.  The error detection rate is about 1 in 4 billion packets 
[PHS95], and is just slightly better than the TCP checksum.  On UNIX, this remediation can be 
done by running the “cksum” program on either side of the network transfer. Another method 
is to utilize cryptographic checksums such as using SHA-1 before and after the transfer by using 
the “sha1sum” program.  This additional error detection can cause I/O and computation 
overhead — as pointed out by Jung et al., “checksum overhead [for computation and I/O] can 
be anywhere between 30% and 100%” [JLKC19]. 
 
Alternatively, in the secure shell v2 (SSH), a 20 byte SHA-1 is used on every packet, resulting in 
an  error detection rate of 1 in 3.8e25, which is approximately 13 orders of magnitude better 
than the TCP checksum, albeit at potentially much slower transfer rates achieved than by using 
GridFTP [ABK+05].  
Data Integrity in Cloud Computing 
A legitimate question about solutions for memory, storage, and data integrity might be, “What 
about using cloud providers, instead?” 
 
Amazon S3 and Google Cloud Storage both guarantees 99.999999999% durability on object 
data storage [S3Data, GCPStorage], and for Amazon, during S3 PUT and PUT Object copy 
operations (but not during compute) [S3Data].   In order to transfer data into and out of S3 and 
to the EC2 compute the AWS tool ‘cloudtrail’ [EC2CT] can be used. It applies a  SHA-256 on both 
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sides of the transfer. In addition, a linked list like structure is used to track any changes to files 
and make sure entire changes are not lost. 
 
Thus what remains, aside from long-term data storage, data transfer, and PUT and PUT Object 
copy operations, are integrity during compute, which includes the processor and memory. 
Computations on EC2 are done with ECC memory enabled [EC2FAQ], significantly increasing 
memory data integrity.  The remaining issue is integrity during computation, an area that cloud 
computing doesn’t especially make easier, because integrity during computation requires 
redundancy.  At the same time both memory and cloud computation are no worse than 
non-cloud computing, and may even be improved given the standard use of ECC memory and 
the presumed optimality of the environmental controls in cloud data centers. 
 
Data Integrity in Extreme Environments 
Ionizing Radiation 
(Ionizing) radiation, such as in space or near high energy equipment can have devastating 
effects on electrical systems.  Experiments looking at data storage [Ngu05] find that all HDD’s 
under test fail if the sum of exposed radiation is over 18 krad(Si).  Further, radiation can also 
cause random bit flips in computation as electrons can be ionized from the radiation and be 
interpreted as as signal when none is present. This effect of incorrect interpretation is 
becoming even greater the smaller chips become — this because fewer and fewer electrons are 
required for such mis-interpretation.  For this reason, shielding or extensive redundancy, such 
as via the  crash-tolerant Paxos methods and/or the Byzantine fault tolerant methods 
mentioned in the “Processor” section above, is essential for high-radiation environments. 
  
Corrosion 
Corroding cables, because of corrosive chemicals (including salt water, for example), will slowly 
increase the resistance of communication and power delivery cables. As the cables corrode, 
signal levels become lower and lower until signals can no longer be interpreted. To discover 
that the data cannot be interpreted, error detecting codes are used, which are present in all 
modern communication system (see sections above). 
 
HDDs on Moving Vehicles 
Magnetic drive heads are mounted just a few nanometers above the magnetic platter and must 
never touch the platter. If the drive head is touching the platter, the head is deformed which 
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will cause it to fail.  For this reason, acceleration and vibrations should be avoided that could 
push the drive head into the magnetic platter.  Further, accelerations and vibrations that cause 
positioning errors (i.e., data is read/written from/to the wrong location) should be avoided. 
Kelly found that position errors from vibrations occur above 0.22 Grms (root mean square 
acceleration) and permanent damage occurs over 0.68 Grms [Kel19].  Further, accelerations 
larger than 60G for an operating drive (350G non-operating) regardless of the time of impact 
causes permanent damage (e.g., because the drive is dropped) [Tom19]. 
 
Sound-Induced Errors 
Disk errors due to sound have also been observed [John18].  In experiments conducted by 
Johnson Controls, performance reductions of up to 50% were observed due to errors that were 
correctable.  Undetected and uncorrectable errors were not part of the experimental results 
reported, but it seems safe to assume that they could exist. 
 
 
5 Summary 
 
We conclude by summarizing the current situation with regard to bit flips due to natural faults, 
and highlighting several best practices to mitigate those. 
 
Data integrity can be affected at every level of computer systems and communication between 
those systems. 
 
The central point that we wish to communicate is that most of the time, data integrity can be 
relatively straightforward to address at low cost and effort.  For data integrity during 
communications, leveraging tools that have cryptographic checksums built in, such as SSH and 
Globus largely solves the issue for communication.  For data at rest, distributing the data in 
multiple independent locations, and leveraging a filesystem, such as ZFS, that checks for and 
mitigates integrity failures, alongside a hardware solution, such as RAID-5 (or above) that 
guards against disk failure, also largely solves the issue for storage.  Alternatively, the use of 
cloud computing resources appears to provide similar protection.  And of course data should be 
backed up alongside cryptographic hashes and periodically spot-checked to ensure no variation 
from the expected hash. 
 
Now that the use of tools such as SSH, ZFS, RAID-5, and cloud computing resources such as AWS 
and GCP are common in many environments, and Globus is well entrenched in the scientific 
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community, taking these steps has gone from being a time-consuming process to one that is 
relatively turnkey.  The smallest scientific computing efforts that may be scraping by on 
computing equipment that is many years old may not be easily capable of leveraging these 
techniques.  However, any project that cares about the data it collects and generates, and who 
can afford a little more time spent properly configuring the system and resources to ensure 
adequate data redundancy, should be implementing these steps, and will largely address data 
integrity due to natural faults by doing so.  While rare exceptions will exist (e.g., environments 
in particularly high radiation or other highly rugged conditions) that require substantially more 
effort, those exceptions are certainly fewer in number, and can and should likely be addressed 
on an individual basis by reviewing specialized equipment made for specialized circumstances. 
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